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THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND ITS INTEREST
An economic process approach to the study of exchange is by means of a strategic market game (see Shubik [8] ; Shapley, [6] ; Shapley and Shubik, [7] ; Dubey and Shubik, [3] ). Price is formed by the simultaneous actions of all agents. One of the simplest models distinguishes one of m commodities as a money. Then m -1 markets are considered in which the money can be exchanged directly for one of the other commodities. The direct exchange of other commodities for each other is ruled out. In contrast, when all commodities can be exchanged directly, then for m commodities there are m(m -1)/2 markets instead of m -1.
A simple geometric representation of trade and markets can be given. Let goods be points and markets be arcs connecting them. Figure la shows the market structure for an exchange economy with four goods where the fourth good acts as a money. Figure lb shows the structure with all markets. Under this description a money is a good which can be exchanged directly for all other goods. In an economy with complete markets all goods are monies.
Suppose that there are m goods and that the mth serves as a money. Dubey and Shubik [3] considered a strategic market game where the strategy of a player u was of the form where 0 < q; Q a," for a = 1, . . . . n, j = 1, . . . . m -1, where n is the number of traders and UT is the initial endowment of individual CI of good j a where b; is the amount of money committed by trader c1 to purchase good j and a: is the amount of money in the initial endowment of a. In this game, as can be seen from the bounds on the strategies, there is no trading on credit. Price (in terms of the money) is formed for good j by dividing the amount of money committed to j by the amount of j placed on sale: i h;/ Ii 4," if i q;fO
The second line in the above definition is just one of several possible trading conventions.
The type of price formation mechanism offered by Dubey and Shubik [3] is a symmetric two sided analogue of the Cournot market mechanism. It is possible to define this mechanism for an exchange economy with complete markets. Here a strategy for an individual will have a dimension of m(m -1). There are m(m -1)/2 markets and an individual can be on either or both sides of each market. For example in the apples for oranges market an individual could supply both apples and oranges. In the stock market, when an individual simultaneously buys and sells the same shares, this is known as a wash sale.
For the strategic market game with m goods, m -1 markets, and one good serving as a money, Dubey and Shubik [3] were able to prove the existence of a pure strategy noncooperative equilibrium (NE)' where each player could be on both sides in each market.
In this paper we have extended the model with (m -1) markets to one with m(m -1)/2 and have been able to prove the existence of an NE with active trade in all markets when there are at least two j-furnished individuals for every good j (no monopolists) and at least two individuals who have positive marginal utility for j. Our approach remains valid when the strategic exchange economy is endowed with any number. of markets between (m -1) and m(m -1)/2. In particular, our existence results (Section 2) subsume those in Shapley and Shubik [7] and Dubey and Shubik [3] . ' We use the abbreviation NE to stand for a pure strategy noncooperative equilibrium.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL AND EXISTENCE RESULTS
Let Z, = { 1, 2, . . . . n} and Z, = { 1, 2, . . . . m} be the sets of traders and commodities, respectively. We shall use Greek letters for traders and Roman letters for commodities.
We assume that each trader CI has an initial endowment a: > 0 of each commodity i. The traders' utility functions are assumed to be strictly concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable functions zP : 52" --, !S1, CrEZ,, where Q", Sz' are the nonnegative orthants in R" and R', respectively. 2 A pair {i, j} s Z, is to be thought of as a market between commodities i and j.
A move by a trader CI is an m x m matrix B' such that: 
2 We may drop the differentiability requirement on the utility functions and only insist that they be continuous. This would entail replacing the infinitesimal argument in the proof of Theorem l(b) by a more careful "finite" argument as in [ 11, using the "uniform monotonicity" lemma from 141.
Finally, the payoffs to the traders are n"(B) = u"(xa).
Given a choice of moves (3) by all the traders except ~1, we say that B" E S" is a "best response" by CI to B-" if n"(B-", B")= sup na(Bpa, Z-). For each m x m matrix E = (Ed), 0 < cii< 1, we consider the game r,, where some external agency supplies the fixed amounts .sii in the various markets, so that the prices are now given by and the other computations are as before.
We define an equilibrium point (EP) of r to be a pair (B, P) such that (1) BisanNEofr (2) pg > 0 for all i, j (3) there is a sequence of matrices E( -+ 0 and NEs B(Q) of r(s,) with prices P(E!) such that B(Q) + B and P(E[) + P.
By kr, (respectively kr) we shall understand the k-fold replication of & (respectively r) in which each trader is replaced by k copies of himself. A type-symmetric Nash equilibrium (TSNE) is an NE wherein identical players employ identical strategies. A type-symmetric equilibrium point TSEP is a TSNE of klr which is the limit in the above sense of a sequence of TSNEs of kTe,.
We say that a good is active at an equilibrium if some trader offers a non-zero amount of that good in exchange for some other good.
The first theorem asserts We start with a lemma which clarifies the underlying geometry of the model. LEMMA 1. In the game Z,, fix a choice of strategies by all traders except a; and let H and ZZ denote, respectively, the set of possible final holdings by 01 and the prices which form as a varies his strategy in S". Then 
and his final holding will be Xi=Up-C tii+C t,ipij j j
Now, suppose strategies T and U in S" achieve x and y in H with prices P and Q in 17. Let rii = (piiqii)"* and vii = [ (cli + tjj)(cji + uv)] lo -cii.
So to complete the proof of part(a), it remains only to show that VE S"; and the only condition to be checked is that But c uij=c (cii+vrj)-C cii
where the first inequality is to Cauchy-Schwartz inequality; and the last inequality holds since T and U lie in S". Part (b) is a simple consequence of part (a) and the arithmeticgeometric mean inequality.
Thus, if V is as before and z is the final holding resulting from V, we have
Finally, since S" is compact and the map from Sa to H is clearly continuous, H must be compact.
The next step is LEMMA 2. For each E > 0, r, has an NE.
Proof: Given a fixed set of moves by the other traders, since ur is strictly concave and continuous, there exists a unique x E H which maximizes ua.
It is easily seen that there must be a unique price P associated with x. For if Q is also associated with x and qii#p, for some i, j, then write riJ = (P&j)'/* and let z be the final holding corresponding to R. Then by the analysis in the proof of part (b) of Lemma 1 we see that z > X; and by the strict artihmetic-geometric mean inequality for (pti, qij) in that proof, it follows that zi > xi.
This contradicts the maximality of x. Consider all the (best) responses by cc which yield the price matrix P. This is clearly a compact, convex, and non-empty set. Then @ is upper semi-continuous, S is compact and convex, and Q(B) is compact, convex, and not empty for each BE S. By Kakutani's Theorem, @ has a fixed point, which is easily seen to be a Nash Equilibrium for r,.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 can be refined to yield LEMMA 3. For each k = 1, 2, 3, . . . . the game kc has a TSNE.
Proof: Let kS be the Cartesian product of the strategy sets of all the traders in kc; and let kS* (~5') be the set of type-symmetric strategies in kS. Then it is clear that for each BE kS*, the set Q*(B) = G(B) n kS* is compact, convex and non-empty.
Let @* be the correspondence B -+ Q*(B). Then @* is upper semicontinuous; and by Kakutani's theorem, it has a fixed point, which is easily seen to be a TSNE of kr,.
This can be strengthened to LEMMA 4. For each k, kc has a TSNE with at least m -1 goods active.
ProoJ: Given a fixed choice of moves by all traders except one, consider the optimization problem faced by that reader. Let C be the aggregate bid matrix of the other traders (plus E). Then if the remaining trader makes the move T, the resulting price is P where
Since the best response price is unique, there is a unique T which satisfies (6) for this price, and also the condition tii. tji = 0 for all i, j. Let us call this the "minimal best response." By the theorem of the maximum in Berge [ 11, the minimal best response map is a continuous function from kS to kS.
We can also define the "maximal best response" (with respect to a fixed ordering of the goods) as follows: Let T be a minimal best response by a trader to moves by the others. Suppose that at T, the trader has non-zero amounts of at least two commodities left over after his move. Choose {i, j} to be the smallest such pair (with respect to the ordering), and let the trader increase his bids on both sides of the (i, j)th market in such a manner that pc remains unchanged. This can be done until the trader has used up all of at least one of the two commodities i and j. Now let him select the next lowest pair and proceed in this fashion until he reaches a strategy T' in which he has used up all of at least m -1 of his goods. Since T' also gives the best response price, it is a best response, which we can call the "maximal best response." Let a': kS + kS be the maximal best response map; then @' is easily seen to be continuous. Furthermore, @' maps kS* (indeed all of '5') into kS*. By Brouwer's Theorem, cb' has a fixed point on kS*.
Since we assumed a; > 0 for all a and i, any fixed point of Cp' has the property that each trader sends a positive amount (a:) of at least m -1 goods to the market. So the fixed points of @' are TSNEs of the desired kind.
We proceed next to the proof of boundedness of prices. In the proof of the next lemma and subsequent discussion, we shall abuse the notation slightly and use the index c1 to represent both a trader and a trader type in "r,. It is easy to see that these cases exhaust all the possibilities.
In (8), we know that e <E; if in addition, n < E, then the increase in CL'S holding of commodity i is greater than jq . pk. Also the decrease in his holding of j is q.
So if 6~' is the increase in 4's utility, we must have
Since b:. is a best response, W must be negative. Therefore, we must have Pij G 3+j(x")l@i(xa);
and if D, is as in (7), then pii<3D,.
Finally, in Case 3, we consider the change in M'S utility if he diverts a small amount q from b;" to b;..
As in Case 2, for sufficiently small 17, the increase in his holding of commodity i is greater than fqpij. It remains to estimate the decrease in his holding of h. Let Now in the present situation, we know that w > (l/m)aT and so if q < (1/2m)ag, the above decrease is less than where D, is as in (9) . Therefore if 6~" is the change in CI'S utility,
for sufficiently small q. Since 6~" must be negative, we must have Since pji = l/p,, the other half of the inequality follows.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix k and choose a sequence (E[) ," , decreasing to zero. By Lemma 4, we can find TSNEs ((BE,, P,,)} of the 'TE, with m -1 goods active. Now, by compactness of the strategy spaces and Lemma 5, we may assume (passing to a subsequence, if necessary) that {(I?,,, PE,)}z, converges to a limit (B, P) with m -1 goods active. Then D > pij 2 l/D, and it remains only to show that (B, P) is a TSNE of klY Let x,, (resp. X) be the allocation resulting from B,, in "r,, (resp. B in kT). First of all, we establish that x,,+ x, as I+ co. For this we examine the contribution at B,, of each market (i j) in kTe, as I-+ co. Clearly, the aggregate (and individual) amounts sent to trade on both sides of the market converge to those at B in kT. So if we aggregate amounts on both sides of the market tend to non-zero limits, then it is clear from (1) and (2) that individual trades converge to those at B in kT. On the other hand, if the aggregate amount on one side tends to zero, so must the other side (by Lemma 5). Consequently the net trade itself tends to zero, and is zero in the limit. We recall the notion of a competitive equilibrium (CE) for the exchange economy corresponding to r. With notation as in the first two paragraphs of Section 2, we proceed as follows:
Given any price vector p E Cl"', the budget set of the trader c( is defined (as usual) to be 
It is well known that any exchange economy which satisfies the conditions in the first two paragraphs of Section 2 has a competitive equilibrium.
A strategic market game, in contrast with the CE model of exchange, is "process and transactions"-oriented.
Liquidity constraints, which have no role to play in general equilibrium, play a fundamental role in a strategic market game. Thus, in such a game, even with a continuum of traders, there may be CEs which are not NEs and vice versa.
Since, in our model, direct exchanges are permitted between all commodity pairs, it may seem at first that the lack of liquidity will never be a constraint on the actions of the traders. However, this is not so; and we give two examples to show this. There is a TSNE with prices pXu = pYz = pzX = 2, where traders 1, 2, and 3 each offer two units of y, x, and z, respectively, in exchange for one unit of goods z, y, and x, respectively, from the traders of type 0. The final endowments of the trader types are (2,2,2), (0, 1, 1 ), (1, 1, 0), and (1, 0, 1 ), respectively.
On the other hand, the unique CE for the related exchange economy has prices pX = pv = pz = 1 and final holdings (1, 1, l), (0, 1,2 ), (1,2,0) and c&o, 1).
Strictly speaking, this example does not satisfy the positiveness conditions imposed in Section 2. The next example does satisfy these conditions, and is furthermore robust. where Iz is some large, positive constant. By virtue of the symmetry of the model, it is clear that there will be an NE with p.ry =pl.= = pzx =p, say. We would like to deduce a relationship between p and A. First of all, it is easy to see that if A is large, then p > 1; and also that at an NE strategy, the bids by player 1 must be of the form where a>O, b>O, and A>a+b.
If ( Using these six relations, we quickly obtain (A-p)2=p(p+2)2.
In particular, if p = 4 then I = 16; and (with a little more calculation) b = 2, a=12, x=8, y=8, z= 2. So the final holdings (for 1= 16) are (8, 8, 2) , (2, 8, 8) , and (8, 2, 8) by the different players. Also, the unique CE has prices pX = py = pz = 1, and final holdings are (16, 1, l), (1, 16, l), and (1, 1, 16 ). It is of some interest to note that in Example 2 the CE allocations are actually achievable through a particular choice of strategies by the various traders. However, such choices will not constitute an NE.
Conditions for Equivalence
Let (B, P) be a TSEP for kr, we say that the TSEP is price consistent if for any three goods {h, i, j} We have phipu = phj e If (B, P) is price consistent, then the matrix P can be expressed in terms of a price vector q such that P,i= 4il4j.
Price inconsistencies at a TSEP imply the existence of arbitrage possibilities which are not being exploited because of liquidity constraints. In fact, we have LEMMA 6. Let (B, P) be a TSEP of kT such that pilizpizi, # pili, for a triple {i, , i 2, i3} of goods. Then for each trader type c(, we must have for some ie {iI, i,, i3}.
Proof: It suffices to prove the lemma for TSNEs of kr(s); but there it must hold, since otherwise such a player would be able to increase his holding of all three goods i, , i2, and i, by an obvious modification of his bid.
The examples in Section 3.1 show that it is possible for all TSEPs of a game to be price inconsistent. THEOREM 2. Let (kB, "P) be a sequence of TSEPs of kr, then this sequence has a limit point, say (B, P). Suppose (1) (kB, kP) are price consistent;
